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TRADE, LAW, AND PRODUCT COMPLEXITY
Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius, and Katharina Pistor*
Abstract—How does the quality of national institutions that enforce the
rule of law influence international trade? Anderson and Marcouiller argue
that bad institutions located in the importer’s country deter international
trade because they enable economic predators to steal and extort rents at
the importer’s border. We complement this research and show how good
institutions located in the exporter’s country enhance international trade,
in particular, trade in complex products whose characteristics are difficult
to fully specify in a contract. We argue that both exporter and importer
institutions affect international as well as domestic transaction costs in
complex and simple product markets. International transaction costs are a
part of the costs of trade. Domestic transaction costs affect complex and
simple products differently, thereby changing a country’s comparative
advantage in producing such goods. We find ample empirical evidence for
these predictions: countries that have good institutions tend to export more
complex products and import more simple products. Furthermore, institutions have a stronger influence on trade via production costs (comparative advantage) than through international transactions costs. International institutions seem to operate as substitutes for domestic institutions,
because good domestic institutions are less important for promoting
exports in those countries that have signed the New York Convention.

I.

Introduction

B

EFORE entering into international trade agreements,
exporters must believe they will receive timely and
appropriate payment with sufficiently high probability, and
importers must believe they will receive timely shipment of
appropriate products with sufficiently high probability. In
this paper we focus on the ways in which formal national
institutions such as courts and bailiffs that enforce contracts
and protect property rights can provide appropriate assurance to exporters and importers, and thereby foster mutually
beneficial trade.1 Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show
that when law enforcement institutions are ineffective, corrupt government officials and other predators are able to
steal and to collect bribes from traders at the importer’s
border. Their empirical work shows that bad institutions
located in the importer’s country raise international transaction costs and deter international trade. We complement
this research: we show how good institutions located in the
exporter’s country can enhance international trade, in particular trade in complex products that are highly differentiated and contain many characteristics that are difficult to
fully stipulate in a contract.
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When rule of law within the importer’s country breaks
down, economic predators can hold up shipments at the
importer’s border. This, in turn, increases both the exporter’s risk of not receiving payment and the importer’s risk of
receiving an inappropriate shipment. However, as noted by
Marin and Schnitzer (1995), efficient international trade
agreements also break down when it is lucrative for the
importer to withhold payment from the exporter, and when
it is also profitable for the exporter to produce a substandard
product. We focus on the role that institutions located in the
exporter’s domicile play in offsetting the importer’s risk of
receiving a substandard shipment. Specifically, contracts
negotiated between exporters and importers—including letters of credit, counter-trade agreements, and prepayment—
are broadly and effectively used in international trade to
offset the exporter’s risk of not getting paid. However,
similar devices are unavailable to offset the importer’s risk.
For example, although importers can use a letter of acceptance to withhold payment until the state of the goods
received is verified, the acceptance periods are short, and
defects that are difficult to verify may become apparent only
later.2 Therefore, it is primarily importers that rely on formal
institutions such as courts and arbitration tribunals for
seeking compensation.
The quality and impartiality of legal institutions in the
exporter’s domicile are critical for offsetting importer risk
because these institutions are the last fallback for resolving
disputes over the quality and assortment of shipments.
Parties can agree in their contract to resolve the dispute in
the importer’s court, the exporter’s court, or a court in a
third country, or they can use an international arbitration
tribunal (such as the International Court of Arbitration
attached to the International Chamber of Commerce, the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre),
or an arbitration board at a trade association, or agree to ad
hoc arbitration. In international transactions, arbitration
clauses are common because arbitration is less formal, is
often quicker, and ensures greater expertise of those hearing
and deciding the case than ordinary domestic courts.
However, courts and arbitration tribunals have similar
problems compensating the winning party if the losing party
refuses to comply voluntarily with the court’s or tribunal’s
verdict. In general, the plaintiff—be she exporter or importer—must cover the fees of the court proceedings as well
as her own attorney fees up front. If the plaintiff loses, she
will not be compensated for these costs, and no further
action must be taken. If the plaintiff wins, however, the
2 Under the Convention of the International Sale of Goods (CISG), for
example, the importer is obliged to examine the goods for defects “within
as short a period as is practicable” after delivery. See Art. 38 CISG.
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verdict stipulates that she is eligible for compensation from
the defendant to cover the losses associated with nonpayment or improper shipments. In addition, the winning plaintiff may be eligible for compensation of court fees and, in
some jurisdictions, for her attorney fees. If the losing
defendant does not live up to his obligations even after a
court ruling, the winning plaintiff will have to mobilize
courts and bailiffs in a jurisdiction where the defendant has
assets and ask them to enforce against such assets, for
example, by seizing bank accounts or confiscating assets.
These rules apply irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
an importer or an exporter. The importer, however, is more
likely to find herself in the position of the plaintiff, because,
as already noted there are effective commercial practices
(such as letters of credit) that protect exporters when importers do not pay, whereas there are no comparably effective mechanisms that protect importers when exporters
deliver defective products. Thus, when the importer is the
winning plaintiff and must deal with a defiant export partner, the court system in the exporter’s country becomes the
last resort for enforcing a ruling.
We develop a theory of legal institutions and international
trade that draws upon the following ideas [for a formal
model, see Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2004)]. First,
the exporter’s risk of nonpayment is effectively offset by
contractual means. Second, good institutions in the exporter’s domicile are critical for offsetting the importer’s risk of
receiving an inappropriate shipment, because contractual
methods for offsetting this risk are ineffective. Third, it is
more difficult for institutions in the exporter’s country to
enforce trade contracts for complex products than for simple
products. Complex products are differentiated and have
many characteristics, including size, design, material, and
other specifications; thus, it is impossible to fully stipulate
an order for these products in a formal contract, rendering
these contracts highly incomplete.3 Because contracts are
less complete for complex than for simple products, it is
more difficult for institutions to determine whether a contract for complex products has been breached or fulfilled.
Fourth, firms that want to buy inputs and outsource on the
domestic markets also depend upon their domestic institutions to limit stealing and corruption and to enforce contracts.
The theory generates testable predictions regarding the
effect of exporter and importer institutions on world trade in
complex and simple products, and we find strong empirical
evidence supporting these predictions. Most importantly,
countries that have high-quality institutions tend to export
more complex products and import more simple products.
Also, we can decompose the influence of institutions on
trade via production costs (comparative advantage) and
international transaction costs, and in so doing we find
3 Ongoing work in contract theory argues that it is impossible to specify
a complete contract for even the simplest products. See Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1999).

production costs have a stronger influence. Furthermore,
international institutions seem to operate as substitutes for
domestic institutions, in that good domestic institutions are
less important for promoting exports in those countries that
have signed a convention that facilitates the enforcement of
foreign and international arbitral awards, namely the New
York Convention. Finally, the effect of institutions on trade
is comparable to other standard determinants such as GNP
per capita, distance between countries, and language differences. The results imply that policies that increase the
quality of legal institutions will have a substantial effect on
trade by deterring predators in both the importer’s and the
exporter’s country, by encouraging exporters to make a
good-faith effort to fulfill their contractual obligations, and
by enabling producers to outsource cheaply within their
domestic markets, thus influencing comparative advantage.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the
relationship between institutions and trade. Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002) establish that high-quality importer institutions reduce predation at the border. Svaleryd and
Vlachos (2001) show that strong financial institutions encourage countries to be more open to aggregate trade.
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) show that institutions cause trade; our paper analyzes how exporter and
importer institutions influence trade in simple and complex
product markets.
Sections II and III below draw a distinction between trade
patterns in countries with good and bad institutions, with an
emphasis placed on the quality of formal legal institutions
such as courts. We draw a distinction between the effect of
institutional quality on trade in what we call simple versus
complex product markets, and we also distinguish between
the effects of these institutions from the exporter’s side and
the importer’s side. Section III differentiates between the
transaction and the production cost effect of institutions and
derives a set of testable predictions. Sections IV and V
describe the data and the procedure for testing our predictions. Section VI reports empirical results, and section VII
concludes.
II.

Institutions, Complexity, and Transaction Costs

Consider how institutions affect trade of two fictitious
countries, called Upper and Lower Slobodia.4 Upper and
Lower Slobodia have roughly the same GDPs, the same
distances from all other countries in the world, the same
technologies, the same populations, the same natural resources, and so on. Thus, ignoring any differences in quality
of institutions, we would predict that these two countries
would have very similar bilateral trade patterns with all
other countries in the world.
Suppose, additionally, institutions are the only difference
between these two countries, and it is Upper Slobodia that
4 We are grateful to a referee for providing this example, which we use
throughout sections II and III.
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has the higher-quality institutions. We are interested in
determining how institutional quality on the one hand, and
product complexity on the other, influence the risk of
importing from Upper versus Lower Slobodia. Regarding
the quality of institutions, an exporter with domicile in
either country has strong incentives to make a good-faith
effort when she believes that the probability she will be
punished for breach of contract is high. A good-faith effort
from the exporter, in turn, increases the probability that the
importer is satisfied. Therefore, the probability that an
importer is satisfied with an export partner is increasing in
the probability that contracts are enforced.
It follows that high-quality institutions in the exporter’s
country, such as courts and agencies capable of enforcing
court rulings, are critical for contract enforcement when the
exporter has breached her contract. Though the parties may
try to opt out of bad domestic institutions in the exporter’s
home country, the importer ultimately depends on the quality of local institutions in the exporting country should the
exporter refuse to comply with a ruling from an arbitration
tribunal or court obtained outside the country. The reason is
that the exporter generally holds the bulk of her assets in her
home jurisdiction, and any attempt to seize these assets in
order to satisfy the importer’s enforceable claim must be
made in her country with the help of local courts and
bailiffs. Put differently, enforcement institutions in the exporter’s home country are the importer’s last resort for
ensuring that she is effectively compensated for breach of
contract.
The probability of enforcement increases when courts
exercise impartiality in their proceedings and rulings, and
when they are sufficiently competent to handle cases involving complex goods. Impartiality refers to the absence of
corruption and to the lack of any home bias that may
influence the court’s verdict. International treaties, in particular the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, have been negotiated in order to mitigate home bias. The treaties commit
countries that have ratified the convention to enforcing
foreign arbitral awards without a review of the substantive
law. Domestic courts may, however, review whether procedural requirements established in the Convention have been
observed, and whether the award is consistent with fundamental principles of public interest (ordre public). One
hundred thirty-four countries have ratified the convention to
date. Still, a number of countries have not done so, and even
some of those that have tend to use ambiguous terms or
exemptions in the treaty to subject the findings of the
foreign arbitration bodies to a full review by domestic
courts and refuse to execute their rulings.5
5 Note that Van den Berg, writing in 1981, found that of 140 published
decisions only 5 refused enforcement on the basis of violation of the ordre
public. See Van den Berg (1981, p. 366). However, complaints about this
practice have become more frequent in recent years since more countries
joined the convention. See Isaacson (2002).
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To demonstrate the uncertainties trading partners face
when enforcement of foreign arbitration awards cannot be
ensured, consider Brazil, which ratified the New York Convention only in 2002. Until 1990, when the Supreme Court
of Brazil changed its previous standard of review, there was
substantial uncertainty about the ability of parties to enforce
arbitration awards against Brazilian exporters (Samtleben,
1994). In one case, the plaintiff, a Dutch company, had
ordered 500 tons of peanut oil from a Brazilian exporter.6
The oil that was delivered turned out to be defective. The
parties had agreed on arbitration by a third party (FOSFA),
which awarded the Dutch company U.S. $220,000 in damages. The British High Court confirmed the award. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Brazil refused to recognize
the award, on the grounds that the Brazilian exporter had not
been formally notified about the arbitration proceedings in
accordance with the law of Brazil. In many cases prior to
1990, Brazilian courts effectively set aside arbitration decisions against Brazilian exporters by invoking procedural
requirements unknown outside Brazil (see Samtleben, 1989,
1994). Thus, if there was a breach of contract by a Brazilian
exporter, importers were uncertain whether an arbitration
decision would be enforced. As a result, importers were
often forced to resort to using costly and highly idiosyncratic adjudication in Brazilian courts.
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Brazil held that in cases
(such as the above) where both parties had participated in
arbitration and had not challenged the procedural rules on
the grounds that they violated domestic law, no party could
invoke these arguments at the recognition stage. In 1996,
Brazil adopted a new arbitration law that confirms this new
case law, and in 2002 it adopted the New York Convention.
Still, these actions may not guarantee that future arbitral
awards will be enforced without attempts to review their
substance. In fact, the 1996 law is currently under review
for its constitutionality. Recent evidence from Russia, Indonesia, and Pakistan suggests that domestic courts are frequently tempted to put aside foreign arbitration awards to
protect domestic companies (Isaacson, 2002).
Product complexity also influences contract enforcement.
Complex products, such as machines and even massproduced clothing, have many characteristics. These characteristics—for example, whether T-shirts should conform
with Italian, French, or U.S. standards for size, material, and
colors, whether a user’s manual for a complex machine is
user-friendly, whether a belt loop for a particular skirt is
fashionable, and so on—are numerous, subjective (as in the
case of fashion or user-friendliness), and highly differentiated across otherwise similar products. The probability that
shipments received by an importer don’t conform to her
expectations increases with a good’s complexity. This follows from the notion that contracts are incomplete and that
6 See Sup. Trib. Fed., 4 June 1980, Naamloze Vennotschap Bunge v.
Industria de Oleos Paceambu S.A. (original decision printed in Rev.
TimrJur. 95, 1001).
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the more complex a good, the more incomplete a contract
involving it. As a result, the probability that a dispute arises,
and thus the dependence of a contract on effective enforcement institutions, including the exporter’s home institutions,
increases when product complexity increases. By implication, in the eyes of the importer, the probability of effective
enforcement increases in the quality of exporter institutions
and decreases in product complexity. It follows that the
probability of an order that an importer expects to be in
compliance with the contract is determined by the quality of
exporter institutions and product complexity. Because noncompliance requires costly legal action after delivery, expected international transaction costs, therefore, jointly depend on the quality of exporter institutions and product
complexity.
Returning to our two-country example, firms importing
from Upper Slobodia with its superior institutions have a
greater probability of being compensated for breach of
contract than firms importing from Lower Slobodia. Given
that contracts involving complex goods are more likely to
be disputed, firms are particularly more likely to import
complex goods from Upper than from Lower Slobodia.
Firms in Upper Slobodia also have a higher incentive to
exert a good-faith effort in that they are less likely to get
away with delivering substandard products. Lower Slobodia, as argued above, can mitigate the effect of the lower
quality of its legal institutions on international transaction
costs by committing itself to international treaties that limit
their effect on contract enforcement. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards is such an instrument, for it forbids
domestic courts to substantially review the awards, and
thereby circumvents the low-quality domestic institutions.
This reduces the likelihood of no compensation for firms
importing from Lower Slobodia, consequently reducing
their expected international transaction costs.
III.

and Lower Slobodia are differentiated only by the quality of
their institutions, this implies that Upper Slobodia has a
comparative advantage in complex products and will therefore export more complex goods than Lower Slobodia.
Our concepts of how institutions are related to transaction
costs and production costs can be used to make predictions
about the effects of institutions on trade in complex and
simple product markets. First, consider institutions in complex markets. Because Upper Slobodia has better institutions, its production costs are lower and the transactions
costs of its potential import partners are lower. Therefore,
we would expect that Upper Slobodia would export more
(herein, more in total value) complex products than Lower
Slobodia. Regarding complex imports, Upper Slobodia will
import less than Lower Slobodia because it has lower
production costs. By contrast, following the argument in
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), higher-quality institutions in Upper Slobodia mean that there will be less holdup
of imports at Upper Slobodia’s border because of piracy and
corrupt bureaucrats, so Upper Slobodia’s transaction costs
as an importer from any other country in the world are
lower. Thus, in Upper Slobodia complex imports are lower
by the production cost effect and higher by the transaction
cost effect, and the overall effect of better institutions in
Upper Slobodia than in Lower Slobodia is ambiguous and
depends upon the relative magnitudes of these two effects.
Regarding simple products, the production cost effect of
institutions in Upper Slobodia as exporter and Upper Slobodia as importer have the opposite signs to their effects in
complex-product markets. Because Upper Slobodia has a
comparative advantage in complex products, it exports
more and imports less complex products than Lower Slobodia. Under balanced trade, it consequently exports less
and imports more simple products than Lower Slobodia.
Thus, Upper Slobodia imports relatively more simple products because of the production cost and transaction cost
effects; however, the overall effect of institutions on Upper
Slobodia’s simple exports is ambiguous and depends upon
the relative magnitudes of the negative production cost
effect and the positive transaction cost effect.
The following table summarizes the argument by indicating the direction of the effects for the empirical analysis. For
example, an improvement in the quality of institutions in the
exporting country increases complex-goods exports overall,
by both the production and the transaction cost effect. The
overall effect is ambiguous for simple goods exports, because the production cost effect is negative and the transaction cost effect is positive.

Institutions and Transaction and Production Costs

Upper Slobodia’s superior institutions may influence not
only exports, but also domestic production and trade. The
production of complex goods in particular involves some
degree of outsourcing, making virtually any production
process dependent on contracts, and therefore on contractenforcing institutions. In the remainder of the paper, we will
refer to the combined domestic transaction and production
costs simply as production costs. Upper Slobodia’s better
institutions then cause production costs for complex goods
to be lower than those in Lower Slobodia. Because Upper
PRODUCTION

AND

TRANSACTION COST EFFECTS

OF INSTITUTIONS

Importer Institutions

Exporter Institutions

Products

Production Costs

Transaction Costs

Overall

Production Costs

Transaction Costs

Overall

Complex
Simple

⫺
⫹

⫹
⫹

?
⫹

⫹
⫺

⫹
⫹

⫹
?
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In Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2004), we build a
two-country general equilibrium model and analyze twoway trade in complex and simple products (this accounts for
81% of all the nonmissing cases in our data set). The model
provides a simple decomposition of export and import
elasticities with respect to institutions into production and
transaction cost components. The elasticities with respect to
the production and transaction cost effects are additive: for
example, the overall effect of exporter institutions on exports is the sum of the production and transaction cost
effects. The model also delivers the familiar result that the
production cost effects for exports and imports in both
simple- and complex-goods markets cancel out (for example, see Flam & Helpman, 1987, section IV). Thus, ignoring
the transaction cost effects of institutions, a 1% increase in
the quality of legal institutions leads to an x% increase in
complex-product exports, and it also leads to an x% reduction in complex-product imports in Upper Slobodia. The
same holds true for simple goods, yet with opposite signs.
Under the assumption that production cost effects cancel
out, we can compute transaction cost effects for both complex and simple goods: for each product category, we can
simply add the elasticity of imports with respect to exporter
institutions and the elasticity of imports with respect to
importer institutions, and the sum is then equal to the total
transaction cost effect of exporter and importer institutions.
Our theory therefore delivers several testable implications. First, we expect that in complex-goods markets the
coefficient for exporter institutions is positive, and the
coefficient for importer institutions is ambiguous. If the
overall effect of importer institutions on complex imports is
negative (positive), this would indicate that the production
cost effect dominates (is dominated by) the transaction cost
effect. Second, in simple-goods markets our theory generates the same predictions for production cost effects, but
with opposite signs. Because transaction cost effects are
positive under general conditions, we expect that an improvement in importer institutions would always increase
spending on simple imports, whereas an improvement in
exporter institutions would decrease spending on simple
imports if and only if production cost effects dominate
transaction cost effects. Third, because production cost
effects for exporter and importer institutions add up to 0 in
both complex- and simple-goods markets, the sum of the
coefficients for the overall effect of exporter and importer
institutions amounts to the sum of transaction cost effects.
These should be positive, for each transaction cost effect of
institutions is positive under general conditions. Finally,
signing the New York Convention as an international institutional arrangement that facilitates enforcement of international arbitration awards and that can, therefore, partially
substitute for bad domestic legal institutions should reduce
expected international transaction costs. In the context of
our example, Lower Slobodia can mitigate the effect of the
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lower quality of its legal institutions on international transaction costs by signing such an international agreement.
In the remainder of this paper, we take these predictions
to the data.
IV.

Data

The data come from a variety of sources. Annual national
accounts data are from the IMF Financial Statistical Yearbook. The gravity controls are from Rauch (1999), for
which we use the 1990 values throughout.7 Data on quality
of institutions come from the International Country Risk
Guide and are reduced to an annual index from a simple
average by country. Each rating ranges from 1 to 10, with 10
representing the highest quality. For our purposes, we include in these ratings an average of indexes of rule of law,
expropriation risk, corruption in government, and bureaucratic quality.8 We do not include the risk of repudiation of
government contracts and ethnic tensions in the averages we
use for our econometric exercise, because those dimensions
do not fit the concept of legal quality for enforcing private
contracts.9 Summary statistics for the average index number
we used in the estimation can be found in table 1A.
Trade data are obtained from the World Trade Database
compiled by Statistics Canada. To categorize the products
into different degrees of complexity, we employ the classification developed by Rauch (1999). Because complexity
cannot be determined directly, he sorts four-digit SITC
industries into trading categories: those goods that are predominantly traded on organized exchanges (metals, pork), those
that are reference-priced (chemicals, fertilizers), and those that
neither have reference prices nor are traded on organized
exchanges (for example, shoes, cars, and machinery). We
reinterpret this classification in terms of product complexity, so
that “organized exchange” denotes low complexity (simple)
and “neither” captures high complexity.10 In table 1B, we
report summary statistics of the relative importance of simple
versus complex products. There are 55 countries (see table 1C)
in the data set, and all variables are either fixed or reported on
an annual basis from 1982 to 1992.
V.

Estimation

In this section, we describe our econometric strategy and
the estimation equation that results from this strategy. We
also discuss some additional econometric issues.
7 This only poses a problem for the language variable because, in some
countries with large immigration activities, its values may not be constant.
However, we think the variations are generally small enough not to change
the results in any significant way.
8 The source is the International Country Risk Guide used by La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998) and Kaufmann (1999). We thank Stephen Knack for
providing these data.
9 However, it should be noted that all results are robust to the inclusion
of these two dimensions.
10 All results for reference-priced, which one might interpret as midcomplexity, are generally consistent with the model we present and are
available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE 1.—A. SUMMARY STATISTICS: QUALITY

OF

LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Value (Index
Number)

Statistics
Overall (year 1990)

Average
Min
Max
Standard deviation

Change over estimation period
1982–1992

Decreasers

Countries Close to Value

4.59
1
7
1.65

Brazil, Chile, Malaysia
Iran, Bolivia, Indonesia, Nigeria
Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark

⫺55%
⫺19%
⫺15%
208%
145%
157%

Increasers

Ethiopia
Hong Kong
South Africa
Iran
Egypt
Morocco

B. Complexity Intensiveness of Exports*
Statistics
Overall (year 1990)

Average
Min
Max
Standard deviation

Change over estimation period
1982–1992

Decreasers

Value

Countries Close to Value

10.7
0.02
165
24.5

France, Ireland, Spain
Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia
Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland

⫺64%
⫺18%
⫺16%
1,406%
3,185%
5,375%

Increasers

Ghana
Hong Kong
Paraguay
Indonesia
Mexico
Venezuela

C. List of Countries
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bel.-Lux.
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Denmark

Ecuador
Egypt
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany, F.R.
Ghana
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India

Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Kenya
Korea, Republic
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands

New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Singapore

South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela

*Ratio (using U.S. dollar values) of complex-product to simple-product exports.

Based on Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Feenstra
(2004) suggests a gravity equation to estimate a model
similar to the one proposed in Berkowitz, Moenius, and
Pistor (2004). However, because our interest is not overall
border effects, but the differential influence of exporter and
importer institutions, our setup differs from his in two
important aspects. First, we differentiate by the types of
goods, in that we introduce both a simple- and a complexproduct sector. We assume that each national economy is
fully described by these two sectors. Second, we utilize a
mechanism that influences both domestic production and
international transaction costs.11 We therefore estimate the
empirical model
IMijtk ⫽ ␣ik ⫹ ␣jk ⫹ ␤ijk Xijt ⫹ ␥ik Iit ⫹ ␦jk Ijt ⫹ εijtk,

where IMijtk denotes the dollar value of imports originating
from country j and shipped to country i in year t and
industry group k: k 僆 (simple, complex). Similarly, Xijt
contains the standard gravity variables, including GDP and
GDP per capita for each country,12 distance between the two
countries, and whether or not the countries share a common
border, have colonial ties, share languages, or are remote.
The coefficients ␣ik and ␣jk are associated with country
dummy variables. Whenever a country is part of a bilateral
trading relationship, this dummy variable assumes a value
of 1; otherwise it is 0. This guarantees that country-specific
effects for both exporters and importers, which can be
assumed constant over our eleven-year period (such as

(1)

11 These two differences require changes in the estimation equation
relative to theirs, as well as in the interpretation of the coefficients,
because the products in our model are produced with different technologies and are subject to different international transaction costs.

12 It is important to note that GDP and GDP per capita were entered
separately in the regression, for the quality of legal institutions is highly
correlated with GDP per capita ( ⫽ 0.82) Furthermore, GDP and GDP
per capita are reported on a yearly basis.

TRADE, LAW, AND PRODUCT COMPLEXITY
TABLE 2.—IMPORT REGRESSIONS POOLED

FOR

1982–1992 OVERALL TRADE
1

2

3

4t

0.81
(39.07)
0.77
(39.78)
0.72
(23.30)
1.04
(32.09)
⫺1.12
(⫺27.30)
0.31
(2.33)
0.51
(4.91)
⫺0.09
(⫺0.54)
0.37
(3.79)

0.81
(38.53)
0.76
(39.13)
0.53
(11.16)
0.74
(13.96)
⫺1.16
(⫺27.97)
0.35
(2.43)
0.42
(4.07)
0.09
(0.51)
0.58
(6.04)
0.61
(5.41)
0.91
(7.12)

⫺0.10
(⫺0.43)
⫺0.13
(⫺0.60)
1.00
(3.80)
1.20
(4.50)
⫺1.02
(⫺27.09)
0.40
(2.64)
0.45
(4.42)
0.99
(5.72)
1.46
(2.21)
0.17
(0.18)
0.32
(3.07)

⫺0.15
(⫺0.52)
⫺0.19
(⫺0.65)
1.18
(4.00)
1.39
(4.63)
⫺1.03
(⫺27.11)
0.40
(2.65)
0.45
(4.40)
1.00
(5.74)
1.79
(2.31)
0.05
(0.51)
0.36
(3.26)

0.076

0.035

0.035

Yes

Yes
Yes

Regression column
GDP importer
GDP exporter
GDP per capita importer
GDP per capita exporter
Distance
Adjacent
Links
Language similarities
Remoteness
Quality of importer legal institutions
Quality of exporter legal institutions
Probability that the quality-of-legal-institution coefficients are the same
Country dummies
Time dummies
Constant
Number of clusters (country pairs)
R2
Observations
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⫺20.04
(⫺12.13)

⫺21.45
(⫺13.16)

2792

2792

2792

2792

0.69
26,577

0.70
23,564

0.77
23,564

0.77
23,564

t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that allow for within-group correlation.

geography and infrastructure in general), are absorbed.13
Our variables of interest are Iit and Ijt, which denote the
quality level of the exporter’s and importer’s legal institutions, hereafter referred to simply as institutions. We estimate equation (1) both for imports overall and separately for
simple and complex goods.
Finally, a feature of the gravity model regressions, which
is problematic for calculating standard errors, is that the
same country’s characteristics will be represented on the
right-hand side repeatedly. Error terms within the resulting
groups of repetitions are likely to correlate with each other,
whereas error terms across groups should not correlate. In
order to allow for this grouping effect, we replace the
traditional Huber-White errors (White, 1980) with robust
standard errors that additionally allow for within-group
correlation. As a result, our standard errors are considerably
higher than those normally reported, and this hurts the
statistical significance of our estimates. However, we include this adjustment in an effort to produce the most
cautious estimates.
13 Feenstra (2004, p. 161) suggests country dummies to capture the
multilateral resistance terms of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In
order to identify our coefficients of interest, we need to assume these
multilateral resistance term to be constant during our sample period. We
will relax this assumption in the next section.

VI.

Results

In order to test these predictions, we proceed in four
steps. First, to best compare our results with Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002) (henceforth abbreviated A&M), we estimate the effect of institutions on overall imports. Next, we
repeat this exercise for simple and complex imports separately. Then we particularly test for the influence of the New
York Convention on trade in simple and complex goods.
Finally, we use disaggregated data on all 471 SITC industries in our panel which allows us to control for a larger
number of influences.
Table 2 reports results for the estimation of the effect of
institutions on imports. In the first column, we present the
results of our estimates when institutions are excluded. We
note that all variables have the expected sign and are of a
reasonable order of magnitude.14 In column 2, we include
importer and exporter institutions. We confirm A&M’s result that importer institutions have a positive effect on
imports. However, we also find that exporter institutions
matter more than importer institutions: the hypothesis that
exporter and importer institutions have the same effect can
be rejected at the 10% level. To check the robustness of our
14

Language is an exception; however, it is statistically insignificant.

370

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
TABLE 3.—IMPORT REGRESSIONS POOLED

FOR

1982–1992, COMPLEX

Regression column

VERSUS

SIMPLE GOODS

1

2

3

4

Complex
0.34
(1.65)
0.58
(2.82)
0.77
(3.16)
0.71
(2.92)
⫺0.98
(⫺24.90)
0.44
(2.62)
0.54
(5.11)
1.27
(6.73)
⫺0.81
(⫺1.30)
⫺0.51
(⫺5.18)
0.85
(7.92)

Simple
⫺1.50
(⫺4.59)
⫺1.81
(⫺5.55)
2.35
(6.05)
2.27
(5.77)
⫺1.26
(⫺22.76)
0.27
(1.55)
0.18
(1.21)
0.11
(0.41)
7.83
(7.91)
0.66
(4.54)
⫺0.53
(⫺3.66)

Complex
0.08
(0.27)
0.32
(1.08)
1.17
(4.05)
1.10
(3.86)
⫺0.98
(⫺24.98)
0.44
(2.62)
0.54
(5.09)
1.28
(6.77)
0.74
(0.96)
⫺0.44
(⫺4.24)
0.93
(8.41)

Simple
⫺1.06
(⫺2.52)
⫺1.38
(⫺3.26)
2.03
(4.70)
1.95
(4.48)
⫺1.26
(⫺22.72)
0.27
(1.54)
0.18
(1.22)
0.11
(0.40)
6.69
(5.50)
0.66
(4.42)
⫺0.53
(⫺3.45)

Probability that the absolute value of the quality of institutions coefficients are the same

0.02

0.54

0.00

0.53

Country dummies
Time dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Number of clusters (country pairs)

2755

2550

2755

2550

0.79
22,669

0.50
18,948

0.79
22,669

0.38
18,948

Goods
GDP importer
GDP exporter
GDP per capita importer
GDP per capita exporter
Distance
Adjacent
Links
Language similarities
Remoteness
Quality of importer institutions
Quality of exporter institutions

R2
Observations
t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that allow for within-group correlation.

results, we first include country dummies to control for
country-specific effects (for example, geography) and then
add year dummies to control for overall time effects (for
example, average growth or technology effects). Both sets
of dummies erase the effects of GDP. They also render the
effect of importer institutions on trade insignificant. However, the effect of exporter institutions on trade survives
these robustness checks, and we are able to reject, at the 5%
level, the hypothesis that importer and exporter legal institutions have the same effect.
In the second step, we reestimate equation (1) for complex and simple imports separately. The results are reported
in table 3. Regarding complex products, recall that we
expect that the effect of exporter institutions is always
positive and the effect of importer institutions is ambiguous.
A negative coefficient on importer institutions suggests that
the production cost effect of importer institutions dominates
their transaction cost effects, which implies that the overall
effect of exporter institutions is greater in absolute terms
than the overall effect of importer institutions in complexgoods markets.15 All of the estimated coefficients match
15 Recall from the above that in complex-goods markets the absolute
value of the coefficient on exporter institutions is the sum of the production and transaction cost effects, because both effects are positive; and the
absolute value of the coefficient on importer institutions is minus the sum
of these two effects, because the negative production cost effect dominates

these predictions, and the hypothesis that the values of the
coefficients on exporter and importer institutions in complexgoods markets are equal in absolute terms is rejected at the
5% level when country dummies are included, and at the 1%
level when both country and time dummies are included.
Finally, recall that the sum of coefficients for exporter and
importer institutions equals the sum of their transaction cost
effects, and that we expect this sum to be strictly positive
under general conditions. The estimates are consistent with
this prediction: they are 0.85 ⫺ 0.51 ⫽ 0.34 and 0.93 ⫺
0.44 ⫽ 0.49 when country dummies or both country and
time dummies are included.
Regarding simple products, our theory predicts that the
effect of importer institutions is always positive. Furthermore, when the production cost effect of exporter institutions dominates. better exporter institutions lower simpleproduct imports. The coefficient estimates for importer and
exporter institutions reported in columns 2 and 4 support
the positive transaction cost effect. Thus, the absolute value of the
coefficient on exporter institutions minus the absolute value of the coefficient on importer institutions equals the sum of exporter and importer
transaction cost effects and exporter and importer production cost effects.
Because exporter and importer production cost effects sum to 0, the
difference between the absolute values for the exporter and importer
institutions is the sum of exporter and importer transaction cost effects,
which is positive.
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TABLE 4.—IMPORT REGRESSIONS POOLED

FOR

1982–1992. COMPLEX

Regression column

VERSUS

371

SIMPLE GOODS (INCLUDING EFFECTS

OF

NEW YORK CONVENTION)

1

2

3

4

Complex
0.17
(0.77)
0.41
(1.86)
0.94
(3.63)
0.90
(3.52)
⫺0.98
(⫺24.53)
0.43
(2.55)
0.54
(5.08)
1.29
(6.78)
⫺0.21
(⫺0.32)
0.16
(0.70)
0.73
(3.00)
⫺0.36
(⫺2.64)
1.07
(7.47)
⫺0.08
(⫺0.55)
⫺0.36
(⫺2.29)

Simple
⫺1.51
(⫺4.29)
⫺1.83
(⫺5.21)
2.32
(5.62)
2.36
(5.64)
⫺1.28
(⫺22.91)
0.22
(1.28)
0.17
(1.13)
0.14
(0.52)
7.82
(7.29)
⫺0.70
(⫺2.02)
0.34
(0.97)
⫺0.005
(⫺0.02)
⫺0.03
(⫺0.13)
0.83
(3.63)
⫺0.56
(⫺2.45)

Complex
⫺0.02
(⫺0.05)
0.22
(0.71)
1.29
(4.18)
1.25
(4.09)
⫺0.99
(⫺24.61)
0.43
(2.56)
0.54
(5.06)
1.29
(6.83)
1.13
(1.37)
0.21
(0.88)
0.77
(3.16)
⫺0.27
(⫺1.97)
1.17
(7.99)
⫺0.11
(⫺0.75)
⫺0.39
(⫺2.48)

Simple
⫺1.22
(⫺2.73)
⫺1.54
(⫺3.45)
2.06
(4.49)
2.10
(4.55)
⫺1.28
(⫺22.87)
0.22
(1.28)
0.17
(1.14)
0.13
(0.51)
7.05
(5.42)
⫺0.72
(⫺2.06)
0.31
(0.88)
⫺0.01
(⫺0.04)
⫺0.03
(⫺0.14)
0.85
(3.65)
⫺0.54
(⫺2.35)

Country dummies
Time dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Number of clusters (country pairs)

2653

2462

2653

2462

0.80
21,850

0.51
18,393

0.80
21,850

0.51
18,393

Goods
GDP importer
GDP exporter
GDP per capita importer
GDP per capita exporter
Distance
Adjacent
Links
Language similarities
Remoteness
New York Convention signed by importer (NYC-I)
New York Convention signed by exporter (NYC-E)
Quality of importer institutions
Quality of exporter institutions
NYC-I ⫻ quality of importer institutions
NYC-E ⫻ quality of exporter institutions

R2
Observations

t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that allow for within-group correlation.

these predictions, and suggest that the production cost effect
of exporter institutions dominates. Again, the sum of exporter and importer institution coefficients equals the corresponding sum of transaction cost effects. In both estimates
the sum of transaction cost effects is 0.66 ⫺ 0.53 ⫽ 0.13,
which is marginally positive and always less than the
corresponding sum of transaction costs for complex imports. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two
coefficients are the same at any reasonable level of significance. Thus, the model provides evidence that general
equilibrium transaction costs are greater in complex markets.
All estimated coefficients can be interpreted as in the
following example: A 10% increase in the legal quality of an
exporting country will—on average—lead to approximately
a 9% increase in complex-goods exports of that country.
This means—again on average—that an increase in rating
value from 6.5 to 7.15 in 1990 for the United States would
have led to an increase in exports of approximately $30
billion worth of complex goods.
Recall that in section II we argued that ratifying the New
York Convention can substitute for bad domestic institu-

tions, because it reduces the function of national courts in
trade disputes (almost exclusively, to enforce arbitral
awards); thus signing the Convention should improve the
quality of courts by lowering their bias against foreigners.16
This reduces importers’ risk of not getting compensated for
shoddy shipments. It also likely increases good-faith efforts
by exporters. We therefore expect that domestic exporter
institutions in ratifying countries will become less important, because international transaction costs are lowered for
both simple and complex goods.
In table 4 we extend the analysis of table 3 to study
whether these predictions hold. We include variables indicating whether a country has ratified the New York Convention. The variable NYC-I equals 1 if the importing
country has done so in or before a particular year, and
equals 0 otherwise. The variable NYC-E is constructed
analogously for the exporting country. Each of these
dummy variables is interacted with both the importer and
the exporter institutions’ variables. Thus, the coefficient on
16

We are indebted to an anonymous referee for recommending this test.
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TABLE 5.—IMPORT REGRESSIONS POOLED
Regression column
Lagged dependent variable
Quality of importer institutions interacted with complexity dummy
Quality of exporter institutions interacted with complexity dummy
Probability that the absolute values of the quality-of-institution
coefficients are the same
Country-pair–year dummies
Country-pair–year–two-digit-industry dummies
Number of clusters
R2
Observations

FOR

1982–1992, ALL 471 INDUSTRIES
1

2

3

4

⫺1.01
(⫺34.97)
1.58
(56.70)

0.86
(1.159)
⫺0.79*
(⫺12.41)
1.65*
(26.46)

⫺0.44
(⫺15.61)
0.62
(22.62)

0.80
(1.187)
⫺0.45*
(⫺5.46)
0.76*
(9.27)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

884,644‡
0.60
3,354,262

793,468‡
0.85
3,062,340

29,938†
0.41
3,354,262

26,504†
0.84
3,062,340

t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors that allow for within-group correlation.
*Coefficients transformed: ␤/(1 ⫺ ).
*Regression coefficients are divided through by (1 ⫺ ), where  is the estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable.
†Country-year pairs.
‡Country–year–two-digit-industry pairs.

exporter institutions measures the elasticity of imports with
respect to exporter institutions for countries that have not
ratified the New York Convention. The interaction term
measures the differential effect of the quality of exporter
institutions if an exporting country has ratified the New
York Convention. If domestic and international institutions
are substitutes, the interaction term for NYC-E with the
quality of exporter institutions should be negative. This
coefficient plus the coefficient assigned to exporter institutions measures the import elasticity with respect to exporter
institutions for those countries that have signed.
Consider imports of complex goods. In this case, the
quality of exporter institutions matters more for the importers when the export partner has not yet signed the New York
Convention. For example, in column 1, the import elasticity
of complex goods with respect to exporter institutions is
1.07 when the exporter has not signed the New York
Convention. This elasticity falls to 1.07 ⫺ 0.36 ⫽ 0.81
when the exporter has signed. On the other hand, the effect
of ratifying the New York Convention is highest for countries with bad legal institutions and almost 0 for those with
the very best legal institutions (for example, 0.73 ⫺ 0.36 ⫻
1.95 ⫽ 0.03, where 1.95 is the maximum value of the
quality of legal institutions).17
For simple-goods imports, we obtain the following striking result: the predicted effects of institutions that we find in
table 3 are present only in those countries that have ratified
the New York Convention, whereas the quality of importer
and exporter institutions does not matter for countries that
have not signed. This is consistent with the view that
international competition only leads to adjustments in domestic markets when costs of trade are sufficiently low.
Overall, we take these results as evidence that international

where k now represents all 471 SITC industries in our
sample, and Fijt are fixed effects that absorb country-pair–
year effects. This specification sweeps away all standard
gravity variables, and therefore Xijt is no longer included in
the regression. Regarding product groups, D is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if the industry falls into the
complex-products category, and equal to 0 if it is in the
simple-products category.18 In our case, we cannot estimate
the effect of importer or exporter institutions per se. All we
can estimate is the differential effect of these institutions on
industries in the complex-goods sector relative to the simplegoods sector. Because we eliminate all other effects, we are
left solely with the differential effect of institutions on
complex relative to simple products.
Table 5 reports the results of this estimation. The first
column refers just to the specification in equation (2).
Regarding complex relative to simple products, we find that
exporter institutions have a positive effect and importer
institutions have a negative effect. Comparing the coefficient sizes with table 4, columns 1 and 2, we should have
expected a coefficient of around 1.36 for exporter institutions (0.85 ⫹ 0.51, because this time we measure relative
to simple products), and around ⫺1.2 for importer institutions (⫺0.53 ⫺0.66). The actual estimates we get are quite
close (1.58 for exporter institutions and ⫺1.01 for importer
institutions). As another robustness check, we include a

17 Recall that our estimation is in logs. Therefore, the minimum, maximum, and median values of the quality of legal institutions are 0, 1.95, and
1.49, respectively.

18 We dropped all goods industries that were reference-priced. Again,
however, our results are robust to these exclusions, and are available from
the authors upon request.

institutions can lower international transaction costs when
they operate as substitutes for domestic institutions.
In our fourth and last step, we subject the findings of table
3 to a robustness check and modify equation (1):
IM ijtk ⫽ F ijt ⫹ ␥DI it ⫹ ␦DI jt ⫹ ε ijtk ,

(2)
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lagged dependent variable as a regressor. The results (reported in column 2) are robust regarding these inclusions.
Columns 3 and 4 in table 5 replace the country-pair–year
dummies with a substantially larger set of country–year–
two-digit-industry dummies with and without a lagged dependent variable. In both cases, exporter institutions have a
positive effect on complex-goods imports relative to simplegoods imports, whereas importer institutions have a negative effect. Table 5 thus confirms that the results reported in
table 3 are strongly robust.
VII.

Conclusion

Drawing on the theory of incomplete contracts, we have
argued that good legal institutions located in an exporter’s
domicile are critical for trade in complex products because
they offset the exporter’s incentive to breach contract. The
analysis has shown that these institutions affect the exporter’s ability to outsource on the domestic market and to sell
on world markets. The effect of institutions on national
transaction costs should influence comparative advantage in
complex products, whereas their effect on international
transaction costs should influence the costs of exporting
complex products. Furthermore, drawing on the work of
A&M, we have noted that good institutions located in an
importer’s country influence trade by lowering predation
risk. Consequently, strong legal institutions in the exporter’s
domicile should increase its comparative advantage in
complex-goods production and lower its comparative advantage in simple-goods production. Furthermore, good legal
institutions in an importer’s country should lead to a shift away
from complex-goods imports into simple-goods imports.
We took these claims to the data and found that domestic
legal institutions have a major effect on trade patterns:
strong legal institutions in the exporter’s country favor
complex-goods exports through a domestic as well as an
international transaction cost effect, where the former dominates the latter, thus influencing comparative advantage.
Domestic and international legal institutions are partial
substitutes for each other, and the substitutability is especially strong for countries with comparatively low-quality
legal institutions.
These findings have important implications: political actors can change institutions and, thereby, indirectly influence the industrial structure in their countries. These issues
are particularly important for developing countries. We will
explore the effect of legal institutions on developing countries in future research.
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